After North Anna
The 2011 Virginia earthquake and the instruments nobody checks
On August 23, 2011, a magnitude 5.8 wikipedia.org/wiki/Earthquake" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="wiki">earthquake hit near Mineral, Virginia, about eleven miles from Dominion's North Anna nuclear station. Both units tripped offline. When Dominion pulled the recordings, the shaking had gone past the plant's Operating Basis and Design Basis Earthquake at some frequencies. That isn't supposed to happen east of the Rockies.
The plant was fine. Dominion's inspections found no significant damage, and its executives argued the real margin was bigger than the paper margin. I believe that. But the part that caught my attention wasn't the concrete. It was the instruments.
Can you even tell what happened?
After an earthquake, a nuclear plant has to answer one question before anything else: how hard did we actually get shaken? Every decision after that, whether to inspect, whether to restart, what to tell the NRC, depends on the answer. That answer comes from seismic instrumentation, and that equipment tends to sit in a corner for decades waiting for a day that never comes. A petition to the NRC after North Anna called out problems with the plant's seismic instruments, including no free field instrumentation.
What I did
I was in Exelon's corporate capital projects group in Warrenville at the time, working instrumentation and controls for the nuclear fleet. After North Anna I assessed the seismic instrumentation at every site in the fleet. The job was simple to say and tedious to do: what does each plant have, does it work, would it give operators a usable answer the day after a quake, and where are the gaps. Each site had some. I wrote up the gaps plant by plant, presented retrofit designs, and put together the remediation plans for the Exelon fleet.
I also raised a newer question: what does fracking do to all this? Injecting fluid deep underground can trigger small earthquakes in places that never used to have them. Nuclear plants were sited and designed against the historical seismic record. If people start changing the ground under the record, the design basis needs to be revisited, not assumed.
Nobody gets excited about seismic monitors. That is exactly why they rot. The lesson of North Anna for me wasn't that plants are fragile. They aren't. It was that the instruments you need once in forty years have to be treated like you need them tomorrow, because when tomorrow comes you can't go back and record it.
A few months after the earthquake, a different blind spot showed up at Byron, this time in the electrical system. That one I still think about.
Inspired by Happy, written by Claude.
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